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FEDERALIZATION: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW
William P. Marshall*
INTRODUCTION
In a letter to Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Attorney General
Janet Reno, then-Senate Judiciary Chair Joseph Biden and then-
House Judiciary Chair Jack Brooks, Ninth Circuit Chief Judge J.
Clifford Wallace suggested that a three-branch conference be con-
vened to initiate a process to evaluate "new federal law and its im-
pact on the federal court system."' To Judge Wallace, the primary
reason for engaging in such a study was a concern about federal
court docket control:
The dramatic growth in the federal caseload, especially before the Courts of
Appeals, has serious implications for the federal judiciary. Obviously,
clogged dockets have resulted in increased delay and expense. Some of the
negative consequences are more subtle, yet just as real. As we are called
upon to resolve more and more cases, our ability to focus attention on any
one case must necessarily diminish, and the quality of our work will suffer.
In addition we have been forced to adopt, and will continue to adopt, short-
cuts to cope with the rising volume: we hear fewer oral arguments, publish
fewer opinions, and rely more heavily on law clerks and staff attorneys. The
heavy volume of cases thus threatens the ability of the federal judiciary to
give each case the attention and care it deserves.'
While Judge Wallace's concerns are more than justified, 3 federal
* Galen J. Roush Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School. I am grate-
ful to Larry Kramer for his comments on an earlier draft. Research and editorial assistance was
provided by Jennifer Sherman.
1. Letter from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge J. Clifford Wallace, to Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, Attorney General Janet Reno, then-Senate Judiciary Chair Joseph Biden, and
then-House Judiciary Chair Jack Brooks [hereinafter "Wallace Letter"] (Mar. 29, 1993). See
Appendix A.
2. Id.
3. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 94 (stating that the increase in the federal caseload threatens the quality of the
federal judiciary); William W. Schwarzer & Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalization of the
Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 STETSON L. REv. 651, 694-700 (1994) (citing
statistics showing an increasing number of federal criminal and civil cases commenced, an increas-
ing number of cases commenced per judge, and an increase in judiciary appropriations). See gen-
erally COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 19-32, 71-86 (Nov. 1994).
719
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
court docket control is not the only problem potentially triggered by
unchecked federalization. Federalization also imposes significant re-
source costs on federal prosecutors and prison systems.4 More
broadly, the constant expansion of federal power through federaliza-
tion undercuts many of the values achieved through federalism.
These include preservation of the role of the states as experimenters
in social policy 5 and the maintenance of their role as a check on the
power of the central government. 6 Similarly, federalization's incur-
sion into the traditional role of states as the primary source of the
citizens' duties and obligations diminishes the authority and prestige
of state institutions - including the authority and prestige of the
state courts.7 Finally, federalization may directly impinge upon indi-
vidual rights as the creation of federal crimes paralleling state of-
fenses perils the protections for the individual found in the Double
Jeopardy Clause.'
Creating a coherent approach to federalization, however, has
proved elusive. Not only are the boundaries of when it is appropriate
to federalize state law amorphous; but more importantly, the ques-
tion of federalization in any concrete example is not easily separated
from the substantive merits of the particular measure in question.
For example, while federalization concerns entered into the debate
over the recently enacted Crime Bill,9 they generally received mini-
4. The federalization of state civil law, while relatively inexpensive when limited to the federal-
izing of state causes of action, can become significantly more expensive if it also involves the
creation of regulatory agencies or the creation of litigation support services.
5. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963) ("Legislative bodies have broad
scope to experiment with economic problems .. "); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federal-
ism: "Converse-1 983'" in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1233 (1994) (quoting Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor's dissent in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-91 (1982) to demonstrate her
praise of federalism as a vehicle for experimentation in government); Edward L. Rubin & Mal-
colm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 907
(1994) (quoting Justice O'Connor's opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) to
show the Court's approval of federalism because it allows for experimentation in government).
6. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 6 (1990) (arguing that state power serves as a check on the
federal government); accord Amar, supra note 5, at 1242; Rubin & Feeley, supra note 5, at 928-
29.
7. See Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 3, at 668 ("Sweeping application of federal criminal
laws to predominantly local offenses can nullify state policy on the prosecution of crimes and the
punishment of offenders.").
8. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 127-39 (1959) (holding that where the defendant was
tried and acquitted in federal court, subsequent trial in state court based on the same acts did not
deprive defendant of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment).
9. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
[Vol. 44:719
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mal consideration relative to the substantive discussion of the con-
crete proposals offered to address the nation's perceived crime
problem.'
Judge Wallace, in short, is correct when he suggests, that the fed-
eralization phenomenon cries out for serious study." The catch,
however, is that since federalization is most often a secondary con-
cern in evaluating proposed legislation, it is questionable as to how
much effect serious study may have in addressing federalization
concerns. To paraphrase Professor Thomas E. Baker, "Federaliza-
tion is not law. It is politics."' 2
Undeterred, I will nevertheless attempt to analyze the federaliza-
tion issue. Part I introduces the issue by noting the recent expansion
in federalization.' Part II discusses the judicial limitations on fed-
eralization imposed by the Supreme Court."' It also addresses the
political restraints that may serve to limit federalization. Part III
offers a modest suggestion as to how the seemingly inexorable trend
towards federalization might be mitigated. It contends that one ar-
gument often presented in favor of federalization - that a matter
should be federalized because it is important to the national agenda
- is fundamentally misconceived and may potentially damage both
federalism concerns and the realization of the substantive goals of
the particular matter for which federal legislation is sought.
I. BACKGROUND: THE TREND OF FEDERALIZATION
One of the central themes of the Republican's "Contract With
America" proposes that power should be returned to the states. 5
1796; see also 140 CONG. REc. H6559 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Rep. Sensenbren-
ner) (arguing that the Crime Bill should be rejected because it is "an assault on federalism").
10. See, e.g., Debra J. Saunders, Uncle Sam's New Tin Star, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 16, 1994, at
A16, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File (noting that the question of whether crime
control is a federal or state issue was barely debated in Congress).
11. Indeed, the good news is that the serious study of federalization is taking place at a wide
range of forums including at the three-branch conference initially proposed in Judge Wallace's
letter. See infra App. A.
12. Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: "Neither Out Far Nor In
Deep," 1994 CASE W. L. REV. (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 38-39, on file with author)
(citing Gene R. Nichol, Is There A Law of Federal Courts?, 96 W.VA. L. REV. 147 (1993)).
13. See infra notes 15-35 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 36-73 and accompanying text.
15. Republican Contract with America, Sept. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Hottop File. The first of three "core principles" of the contract states: "Accountability - The
government is too big and spends too much, and Congress and unelected bureaucrats have become
so entrenched to be unresponsive to the public they are supposed to serve. The GOP contract
1995]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Section nine of the contract, however, proposes that tort law should
be nationalized,16 and sections two and four advocate the further
federalization of crime.17 I mention this not necessarily as a critique
of the Republican agenda but as evidence of the political realities
underlying the federalization debate. While no one appears to favor
the federalization of state law in the abstract,'" virtually every con-
stituency supports federalization when it is consistent with their own
substantive agenda. The pro-life and pro-choice forces, for example,
may not have much in comhon; but it is quite clear that their ap-
proaches to federalism were to be the same if Roe v. Wade'9 had
been overturned. Both sides had indicated that the legislative battle
over abortion was not going to be returned to the states, but rather
was to be fought in the Congress.2"
Indeed the trend towards federalization is increasingly obvious to
anybody perusing the pages of the United States Code.2 In 1992, as
Judge Wallace notes, Congress made carjacking and willful failure
to pay child support federal crimes. 2 Both provisions, however, pale
in comparison to the Crime Bill which added over 100 new federal
criminal provisions including making everything from crossing state
lines to engaging in spousal abuse or gang-related street crime a
restores accountability to government." Id.
16. Id. at § 9 (" 'Loser pays' laws, reasonable limits on punitive damages and reform of prod-
uct liability laws [are needed] to stem the endless tide of litigation.").
17. Id. at § 2 ("An anti-crime package including stronger truth-in-sentencing, 'good faith' ex-
clusionary rule exemptions, effective death penalty provisions, and cuts in social spending from
this summer's 'crime' bill to fund prison construction and additional law enforcement to keep
people secure in their neighborhoods and kids safe in their schools."); see also id. at § 4 (calling
for the federalization of child pornography).
18. But see Rubin & Feeley, supra note 5, at 951 (arguing that the merits of federalism are
overstated).
19. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (holding that Texas criminal abortion statutes
which prohibited abortion at any stage of the pregnancy, unless necessary to save the life of the
mother, are unconstitutional).
20. See The Freedom of Choice Act of 1993, S. Rep. No. 42, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.; see also
Frank Reeves, Abortion Offers Political Contrast; Senate Candidates Hold Different Views on
Controversial Issue, PITT. POST-GAZETTE. Oct. 21, 1994, at BI, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Curnws File (reporting that Congressman Rick Santorum stated that if Roe v. Wade were
overturned, he would favor a federal law prohibiting abortion).
21. It is not suggested that federalization is only a one way street. As the current Congress has
evidenced, defederalization may occur. However, it seems fair to say that the overall trend is
towards increased and not diminished federalization. Moreover, when defederalization does occur,
it generally arises from objections to substantive policy and not from abstract federalism concerns.
22. See Wallace Letter, supra note 1, at 3 (citing Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.




federal criminal offense.23 Indeed, according to one study based
upon information obtained from the Administrative Office of the
United State Courts, there have been 202 new laws created by Con-
gress in the last twenty years that have added to the workload of the
federal courts. 4
The reasons behind this trend are not difficult to discern. To begin
with, interest groups supporting particular measures are likely to
prefer legislation at the national level. Professor Jonathan R. Ma-
cey, for example, has offered four cogent reasons to explain why this
is so." First, changing federal law requires less transaction costs
than does state law. "It is simply less expensive to obtain passage of
one federal statute than to obtain passage of fifty state statutes...
."26 Second, proceeding at the federal level is more efficient because
even if statutes are passed at the state level the shadow of federal
law cannot be avoided. "[P]olitical support must still be provided to
federal regulators to induce them to forbear from later preempting
the field. .. . Third, federal law is "often considered a higher
quality product than state law."2 Fourth, "federal law is harder for
adversely affected parties to avoid than is state law."29 There is also
another reason which I shall return to subsequently." Federalization
may be sought in order to emphasize the importance of the issue
involved. An interest group may be concerned that without the im-
primatur of federal law or federal jurisdiction, the matter of concern
will not be perceived as being at the forefront of the national
agenda."
The trend towards federalization is also attributable to the fact
23. See App. B (citing Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, §§ 40221, 110401, & 150001, 108 Stat. 1796, 1926-31, 2014-15, & 2033-35).
24. Baker, supra note 13, at 39-48.
25. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 271-73
(1990).
26. Id. at 271.
27. Id. at 271-72
28. Id. at 272.
29. Id. at 272-73.
30. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (discussing how interest groups also prefer
legislation at the national level because such legislation often signifies that the substantive issue is
of national concern).
31. See Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal
Courts. 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1749-50 (1991) (arguing that the unchallenged exclusion of
"family concerns" from federal jurisdiction demonstrates the marginalization of women in the
federal courts).
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that the desire of interest groups to seek legislation at the national
level is complemented by the interests of the federal officeholders
from whom legislative action is sought. Again the reason is straight-
forward. Federal officeholders are in the business of incurring voter
support. 2 If the voters desire a particular type of legislative action,
the federal officeholder will want to be seen as supporting and work-
ing for that legislative measure.3"
This, of course, does not mean that a federal politician may not
be benefitted by extolling the virtues of federalism and advocating a
return of power to the states. As the 1994 elections show, there can
be a lot of mileage to be gained at times in arguing that the federal
regulatory state should be downsized or that large federal programs
such as national health legislation should be opposed. But that argu-
ment, if it is to be effective at all, is likely to succeed only when
raised against federal regulatory law or when there is not a great
deal of support for the substantive matter for which federalization is
sought. In most other circumstances, particularly with respect to the
federalization of criminal law, the federalism argument is likely to
have appeal only in the abstract. It may win votes, for example, to
claim that one is in favor of returning power to the state - it is
seldom a vote winner to assert that one is not going to vote for a
popular criminal measure on the grounds that it conflicts with a the-
oretical vision of federalism. Consider, for example, the recent
Crime Bill's provision federalizing street crime by gang members.,
Anyone who opposed this measure on federalism grounds would
have to face the likely political specter that his vote would be char-
acterized as being soft on gang violence. The result is that the deci-
sion to federalize can be boiled down to one simple formulation:
whether a matter will or will not become federalized depends en-
tirely upon its political attractiveness to the federal office holders."
And while a federal politician's reaction to proposed legislation may
be influenced by federalism concerns, these concerns are likely to
have only a secondary influence relative to her approval or disap-
32. Macey, supra note 25, at 265 nn.3-4 (citing George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971) and Sam Peltzman, Toward a More Gen-
eral Theory of Regulation. 19 JL. & ECON. 211 (1976)).
33. Id. For a discussion of the potential political restraints on the process that might work to
limit federalization, see infra notes 55-73 and accompanying text.
34. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 15001,
108 Stat. 1796, 2033-35.
35. Macey, supra note 25, at 267.
[Vol. 44:719
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proval on the substantive goals of the potential legislation.
II. THE RESTRAINTS ON FEDERALIZATION
A. Constitutional and Other Judicial Limitations
A review of the constitutional limits on the federalization of state
law is necessarily succinct. In essence, there are few, if any, limits.3 6
Since the early 1940's, the Court has consistently indicated that
there are few, if any areas, that the federal government may not
regulate. 7 True, there may be some limits on Congress' ability to
impose affirmative obligations on states 8 or some limits with respect
to the manner in which Congress chooses to impose regulatory
schemes upon the states. 9 It may even be that the Court will ex-
pand on its decision in United States v. Lopez4 ° to find significant
constitutional limitation on the reach of Congressional power. But
even though Lopez does hold that Congressional power to regulate
private activity is not unbounded, the decision does not, as Professor
Larry Kramer predicted, appear likely "to curtail [federal power] in
36. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (1994) (citing the
Supreme Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550
(1985)). For a criticism of the Court's approach in this area, see Martin H. Redish & Karen L.
Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U
L. REv. 1, 4 (1987) (arguing that the text of the Commerce Clause imposes some limitation on
federal power).
37. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 146-47 (1971) (holding that portion of Consumer
Credit Protection Act prohibiting "loan sharking" activities is within Congress' power under the
commerce clause to control activities effecting interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 300-05 (1964) (holding that Congress was justified in finding that racial discrimination
at restaurants had a direct effect on interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (holding that the public accommodations provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1954 are valid under the commerce clause); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill,
125 (1942) (holding that the commerce power extends to those activities which have an aggregate
effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122 (1941) (sustaining the
federal power to regulate the production of goods for commerce).
38. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2427-29 (1992) (holding the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act's "take title" provision, which required the states to take
ownership of the wastes or follow Congressional regulations, was inconsistent with the Tenth
Amendment, as Congress is only authorized to regulate interstate commerce directly and is not
permitted to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce).
39. In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), for example, although the Court upheld
Congress' attempt to coerce the state into adopting a 21 year drinking age requirement by condi-
tioning the state's receipt of highway funds upon their adoption of the 21 year old limit, it never-
theless held that there might be some circumstances in which Congress' use of its spending power
in this manner would be unconstitutional. Id. at 211.
40. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that a federal law which prohibited the possession of guns
within a certain distance of a school exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause power). Lopez was
decided as this Article was going to print.
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any significant way."41
Of course, some revisionist doctrinal analysis might be offered in
support of the proposition that the Court has not wholly abdicated
federalization review. Arguably, whether intentional or not, the
Court has occasionally slowed federalization through the use of rigid
rules of statutory interpretation.42 For example, the various cases in
which the Court has required "clear statements," before it would
interpret statutes in a way that imposed obligations on the states
may also be seen as mechanisms aimed at slowing the federalization
wave.43 Similarly, the cases in which the Court has held that there
must be an explicit indication that Congress intended to create a
private right of action make more sense if viewed as an effort to
minimize the creation of federal substantive law rather than as a
doctrine addressing concerns of separation of powers."' And the
holding in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,45 that
federal jurisdiction would not be recognized over a state court's
remedy incorporating a federal standard,40 makes more sense when
viewed as an attempt to reduce the docket load of the federal courts
than it does as an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 "arising
under" requirement.47 Indeed, when pitted against a background
concerned with the political inability of the federal government to
limit its own power, a wide range of cases begin to develop a new
41. Kramer, supra note 36, at 1487 n.4. In response to Lopez, the Clinton administration, for
example, immediately proposed a new statute prohibiting possession of guns near schools, adding
only the element that the guns must be shown to have been moved in interstate commerce.
42. George D. Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court - How the Eleventh
Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. L.J. 363, 390 (1985) (arguing that the "clear statement" rule allows
the judiciary to be assured that Congress has considered the implications of subjecting a state to
federal jurisdiction).
43. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 455, 473 (1991) (holding that a clear statement
would be required to construe a federal statute to state officials); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491
U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (holding that Congress may abrogate a state's immunity only by making its
intention clear in the language of the statute); accord Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
44. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979) (stat-
ing that to decide whether a statute creates a cause of action, either expressly or by implication,
the court must determine if Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted, and the
inquiry must begin with the language of the statute itself).
45. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
46. Id. at 817.
47. Id. at 805. The issue presented to the Court in Merrell Dow was "whether the incorpora-
tion of a federal standard in a state-law private action, when Congress has intended that there not
be a federal private action for violations of that federal standard, makes the action one 'arising





Nevertheless, even if all of these cases are added together, it is
quite clear that the end result is little more than a holding action
slowing the increase of the expansion of federal substantive law and
federal jurisdiction only at the outer margins. Combatting the en-
croachment of federalization by creating various doctrines which
amount to no more than possible annoyances is not an effective tech-
nique. First, their use has been relatively limited. For example,
strict rules of statutory interpretation with the effect of limiting the
scope of federal law, have not generally been used in the area of
criminal law,4" although this is the area where the most dramatic
increases in federalization have taken place.50 Second, the statutory
interpretation method is disingenuous;51 and although judicial credi-
bility, in an area that has produced cases such as Mitchum v. Fos-
ter,52 may not seem to be of much matter to the Justices, there is
some value in coherent and consistent decisionmaking. Third, in
terms of inhibiting federalization, the statutory interpretation rules
are at best temporary devices. Congress may amend its statutes to
more clearly indicate that it intends federalization to take place. In
short, having held in its Commerce Clause, Spending Clause, and
Tenth Amendment decisions that there was no substantial bar to the
expansion of federal power at the expense of the states,53 it seems
half-hearted at best that the Court would try to reclaim ground on
behalf of the states by the creation of "clear statement" rules and
other such devices. 4
48. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548 (1989) (holding that Congress has the
constitutional authority to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts); Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983) (holding that a district court's
federal-question jurisdiction extends over "only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint
establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law").
49. NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
49 (1993).
50. See Baker, supra note 12, at 53.
51. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV.
423, 437 (1988).
52. 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972) (construing § 1983 (the Civil Rights Act) to bean implied
.express" exception to the Anti-injunction Act).
53. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing examples of these cases).
54. See. e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2633 (1992) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (explaining that "clear statement" rules, along with "plain statement" and "narrow con-
struction" rules, are designed to ensure that "absent unambiguous evidence of Congress's intent,
extraordinary constitutional powers are not invoked, or important constitutional protections elimi-
nated, or seemingly inequitable doctrines applied").
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B. The Political Restraints on Federalization
With the absence of meaningful judicial constraints on federaliza-
tion, the only limitation is political. Indeed this is the positive theory
offered by the Court in justifying its abdication of the judicial role
in enforcing restrictions on Congressional power. Relying on the
theory of process federalism, outlined by Professor Herbert Wechs-
ler and Dean Jesse Choper, 55 the Court has justified its abdication
of the judicial role by arguing that the states' interests are ade-
quately protected through their representation in the processes of
the federal government.56 Because of this representation, the theory
argues, additional judicial protection is not needed. 7
In a recent important article, Larry Kramer examined Wechsler's
and Choper's theories of process federalism and found them lacking
- at least in their explanation of how the processes of federalism
actually work to protect state interests.58 According to Kramer, the
particular constitutional provisions cited as supporting the states'
representation in the federal government no longer, if they ever did,
provide the political protections for state interests that the process
federalism theory suggests.59
55. See. e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 n.ll (1985)
(overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)) (citing JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 175-84 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards
of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Govern-
ment. 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546-58 (1954)).
56. Id. at 550-51 ("It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government
was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. The Framers thus
gave the States a role in the selection both of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the
Federal Government.").
Garcia also relied on the argument that distinguishing between the appropriate spheres of fed-
eral and state regulation was "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice." Id.
57. Id. at 551-52.
58. Kramer, supra note 36, at 1503-14. He also addresses the theory of Professor Bruce La-
Pierre, which argues that there are two structural checks on federal overreaching. First, "states
have the benefit of virtual representation from private interests because 'nationally determined
substantive policy' also applies to private activity; second, that the federal government is con-
strained because it must lay out the 'financial and executive resources to administer and enforce
national policy.'" Id. at 1512 (citing Bruce LaPierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism
Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L. Q.
779, 988 (1982)).
59. Id. at 1506-07.
These arrangements consist of the following: representation in Congress is allotted by
states; qualifications to vote in federal elections are determined by state law; Repre-
sentatives are elected in districts drawn by the states; each state has equal representa-
tion in the Senate through Senators chosen by the state's legislature; and presidential
candidates must obtain a majority in the Electoral College.
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On the other hand, as Kramer observes, it is still true that most
law that directly effects the daily lives of individuals has not been
federalized.6" Kramer, then, rightly concludes that even if the par-
ticular mechanisms identified by Choper and Wechsler are ineffec-
tive or anachronistic, clearly "something is acting to perpetuate the
role of the states." '61 The question then is to determine what is pro-
tecting the states; and although Kramer purports to only begin the
debate and not to offer definitive answers, he does offer some tenta-
tive suggestions.
Specifically, Kramer finds the protection of states' power to be
found primarily in political parties.6" He argues that the mutual in-
terdependence that political party affiliation creates between candi-
dates for national office and candidates for local office furthers fed-
eralism policies.63 According to Kramer, this interdependence forces
the national office seeker to defer to the interest of his local counter-
part in assuring that the federal government does not usurp state
functions and responsibilities.64
Kramer's observations are insightful and have powerful explana-
tory force. On the other hand, the restraints on federalization cre-
ated by political parties, like the Court's clear statement rules, may
Id. at 1506 (citing Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543,
546-58 (1954); JESSE H, CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 176-81 (1980)).
60. Id. at 1504. Kramer's observation is shared by Jesse Choper: "The fact is that state and
local governments have flourished and expanded greatly during the sixty years that the Court has
operated on 'the proposition that the political process alone sufficiently protects federalism and its
underlying values.'" It would be a serious mistake to equate the enormous growth of the national
government during this period with a diminution of state and local power. Jesse H. Choper, Feder-
alism and Judicial Review: An Update, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q 577, 590 (1994).
61. Kramer, supra note 36, at 1521 (emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 1522-23. Kramer also finds a secondary role to the protection of state power in the
structure of the administrative bureuacracy. Id. at 1543. He argues that "the interdependence of
legislation and administration gives administrators a voice in the lawmaking process" and con-
cludes that this relationship gives state officials a strong voice in the federal lawmaking process.
Id. To Kramer, the mutual reliance that has developed between state and federal officials will
serve to perpetuate the role of the states and also will impede any danger of over-federalization.
Id. at 1544. The check on federalization of the bureaucratic interplay between state and federal
administration, however, may be as extensive as Kramer suggests. While federal officials still need
to depend on state governments, their dependence serves only a limited check on federal power.
For example, under federal and state cooperative programs, the federal dependence of states is
accomplished primarily through federal mandates which allows control to remain with federal
officials. As such, the result is not a true interdependent relationship. More importantly, the gov-
erning law is federal, not state.
63. Id. at 1523.
64. Id.
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ultimately work only as holding mechanisms, perhaps delaying, but
certainly not substantially limiting, the growth in federalization.
This is so for a number of reasons. First, as Larry Sabato notes:
there are considerable limitations on the influence Ameri-
can parties can exert On legislators under even the most
favorable of conditions. Parties are certainly a more sub-
stantial source of cash and campaign technology than ever
before, but they are not the only source by any means.
While a legislator will not wish to offend any major bene-
factor, he or she will do so when necessary so long as other
alternative support is available. Then, too, parties are
hardly inclined at election time to discipline their incum-
bents - almost any incumbent, however uncooperative or
obnoxious. Since the overriding objective is victory, the par-
ties will normally choose the pragmatic course and aid any
party candidate, rather than reward only some while pun-
ishing others and risking their defeat. 5
Second, while it is certainly true that political parties may exer-
cise constraints on some federal office holders, other federal officials
may not be all that beholden to their state party organization. The
ability of wealthy and/or celebrity candidates, for example, to at-
tract their party's nomination for political office without having
gone through normal political routes may diminish the dependency
that Kramer discusses. 6
Third and more significantly, Kramer's political interdependence
argument has validity only in those situations where members of the
same party hold both state and federal office at the same time. For
example, while a federal officeholder may defer to local and state
officeholders by not supporting the federalization of a particular
matter when her party is in power in her home state, she has no
similar motivation when her party is not in power in the state. For
example, a Republican Congressperson working for tort reform may
65. LARRY J. SABATO, THE PARTY'S JUST BEGUN 100 (1980).
66. Kramer argues that even the most independent candidate must rely at least in part on party
structure to provide the necessary resources for running for office such as computerized data
banks, etc. Kramer, supra note 36, at 1535. Even so, the tie in between the provision of campaign
resources and a quid pro quo on federalization issues is not immediately clear. Perhaps a candi-
date may feel some obligations to party organization leaders who have provided campaign re-
sources. But party leaders are not always the same as state officeholders and obligation to one does
not mean obligation to another. And it has been my experience at least that party leaders are
often only tangentially interested in substantive legislative enactment. Their allegiance, is to those
who win. See SABATO, supra note 65, at 100.
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feel obligated to oppose national tort reform legislation when Re-
publican office holders are seeking reform at the state level. On the
other hand, if the Democrats are in control of the state government
and are not pursuing policies consistent with the Republican Con-
gressperson's agenda she would likely feel no constraints. Indeed,
even if the Democrats are pursuing similar goals, the Republican
Congressperson may want to proceed at the national level, if only to
assure that she, and possibly her party, earn the political credit. For
these reasons, local elected Republicans within the Congressperson's
state are likely to support her efforts directed at federalization.
Fourth, the political party theory, like Wechsler's and Choper's
process federalism does not recognize that the erosion of state power
and responsibility is more gradual than sudden. For example, even if
a federal office holder feels indebted to his state counterparts and
for that reason chooses not to support a federalizing provision, the
likely result is that the federal office holder will compromise; that is,
the federal office holder may agree that some matters of state law
become federalized while other matters remain within state govern-
ance. Indeed, this is the likely scenario that just occurred in the
Crime Bill.67 While some of the most radical provisions federalizing
state law were rejected, the eventual result was that significant ero-
sion of traditional areas of state power took place.6 8
Fifth, there are many federalization issues, particularly those in-
volving the criminal law, where any mutual interdependence that
state and federal office holders may have is unlikely to be of re-
straining influence at all. Carjacking is one example. State legisla-
tors do not have any particular reason to oppose this crime being
made a federal as well as a state offense. Indeed they all may view
it as a positive step, in lessening both the political demands being
levied on them to address the problem and the resource demands in
investigating, prosecuting, and trying the case.69 Rather the groups
likely to oppose the federalizing of carjacking are federal judges
concerned with docket problems, 70 the criminal defense bar con-
cerned with prosecutorial avenues around double jeopardy protec-
67. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796.
68. See App. B (citing new offenses and changes included in the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994).
69. Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 3, at 670-71.
70. Id. at 670.
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tions, 71 and theoreticians concerned that too much state law is being
federalized. None of these groups (although the federal judiciary
has certainly tried) have the political clout to represent the states as
states in the federal political process.
This leads to a final and important point. The weakness with any
theory that asserts that federalism concerns are protected through
the political process is that the political actors ostensibly charged
with defending state interests may not always be concerned with de-
fending the underlying values that federalism represents.72 The in-
terest in protecting state power (and its accordant federalism val-
ues) is waivable, under the political process theories, by those who
have little or no interest in federalism's protections.73 In short, while
federalization of state law may not be wholly free from political
checks, the political checks that do exist do not go very far in assur-
ing that federalism concerns are adequately protected.
III. POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF A MATTER AND WHETHER IT SHOULD BE
FEDERALIZED
Kramer, however, is undoubtedly correct in asserting that the po-
litical limitations on federalization are essentially functions of "po-
litical culture," or the "shared understandings of political actors. 7
71. See Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathon L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995) (arguing that dual enforcement allows "federal and state govern-
ment acting in tandem, [to] do what neither government can do alone-prosecute an ordinary
citizen twice for the same offense").
72. The primary values underlying federalism have been identified as preserving states as labo-
ratories for legislative experimentation, the role of the states as decentralized competitors, the
states as guardians of individual rights, and the role the states serve as a check on the federal
government. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federal-
ism After Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 341. While, in the abstract these values may appeal to the
political sensibilities of some federal officials, it is difficult to discern any direct benefit that federal
officials receive as federal officeholders in enforcing federalism values. Perhaps the best argument
in this respect is offered by Akhil R. Amar, who argues their very structure of national offices
creates strong political incentives for "national office-holders to attend to state and local concern"
because the states may serve as the citizens' measuring stick in evaluating federal activity. Amar
& Marcus, supra note 71, at 2.
73. In contrast, note that the political culture does not effect the constitutional principle of
separation of powers; this structure is not waivable. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59
(1983) (holding the section of the Immigration and Nationality Act which authorized one house
to veto the decision of the executive branch was unconstitutional based on separation of powers
concerns); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952) (holding that
the issuance of a seizure order exceeded the constitutional bounds of the President's authority).
74. Kramer, supra note 36, at 1505.
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As he explains, the means by which political power is to be allocated
between the states and the federal government will primarily depend
upon the "customs, ideas, beliefs, experiences, and practices of the
people involved." 75
The way in which the political culture has changed, however, does
not bode well for those opposing federalization. For example, Pro-
fessor Wechsler, writing in 1954, argued that states were protected
because the political tradition was such that federal intervention was
seen as exceptional and justified only by special necessity.76 The rec-
ognition that most law should remain in the province of the state,
moreover was not simply a product of the political culture of the
United States Congress. It was also reflected in a number of the
judicial decisions of the United States Supreme Court which limited
federal jurisdiction on grounds that certain matters should not be
removed from state oversight. Examples of this included probate,77
domestic relations, 78 and some matters involving property rights.7 9
The political notion that federal involvement is exceptional, how-
ever, is no longer the norm. As Kramer argues, the belief that "our
constitutional tradition requires [Congress] to have special justifica-
tion before displacing state law . . . is not an important part of the
political scene in Washington today." 80 The result is that there are
currently few areas, if any, which the political culture treats as
outside the range of appropriate federal governance. 81
Perhaps more significant for federalization concerns is not the
tenet of the political culture that has been abandoned but the one
that has risen in its stead. The apparent new principle of the politi-
75. Id. at 1551.
76. Wechsler, supra note 55, at 544.
77. Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S. 608, 615-20 (1893) (stating that since a probate administrator
appointed by a state court is an officer of that court, property possession cannot subsequently be
disturbed by a federal court without invading the state court's jurisdiction).
78. See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 81 (1944) (establishing by dictum the domestic rela-
tions exception to federal jurisdiction).
79. See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thiebodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1959)
(holding that federal abstention is appropriate when there is an unsettled question of state law in
an area of particular local concern, such as eminent domain); see also Shoshone Mining Co. v.
Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 513 (1900) (holding that a federal remedy affecting property claims does
not give rise to "arising under" jurisdiction).
80. Kramer, supra note 36, at 1505.
81. Larry Kramer argues that other facets of the political culture continue to inhibit federaliza-
tion. These include the fact that many federal officeholders come from state government back-
grounds, that state and local offices exert powerful lobbying influence on the federal government,
and that both bureaucratic and grass-roots forces continue to demand that significant powers be
exerted at the local level. Id. at 1551-54.
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cal culture's approach to federalization is that candidacy for federal
law and federal jurisdiction should be assessed by the "importance"
of the substantive issue in question. This principle was originally of-
fered, interestingly enough, as an effort to inhibit federalization.
Justice Rehnquist, for example, has used the argument that the fed-
eral courts are to be "reserved for issues where important national
issues predominate,"82 as an argument for limiting federal jurisdic-
tion. But while the genesis of the importance notion may have been
an attempt to limit federalization, the importance principle may ul-
timately work more as a catalyst for the expansion of federal power
than as a limitation.
First, if importance is interpreted to mean important to most peo-
ple, then we are only at the tip of the federalization iceberg.83 While
federalization has begun to encroach upon traditional matters of
state governance, it is still true that the law that most profoundly
affects the daily lives of the citizens has not yet been removed from
the province of the states. In the civil area, this includes property,
probate, domestic relations, contract, and tort law;84 in the criminal
area it includes murder, rape, and felonious assault.85 A political
culture stressing the appropriateness of federalizing what is "impor-
tant" is likely to federalize a number of matters in these areas -
particularly in the criminal law. 86
Second, the move to the importance of the substantive issue as
being pivotal in whether or not to federalize, increases the stakes
that many constituencies have in federalization because it essen-
tially asserts that failure to federalize is equivalent to a statement
that the matter for which federalization is sought is not of national
concern. Indeed, this is the thrust of Professor Judith Resnik's arti-
cle "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction and the
Federal Courts.8 7 Resnik objects to the federal courts' systematic
exclusion of matters that are of particular concern to women, on the
82. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 24
THE THIRD BRANCH I, 2 (1992).
83. Of course, it could be argued that importance is not intended to be interpreted in this
manner. Certainly, it does not appear to be the meaning that Justice Rehnquist intended. On the
other hand, given the realities of the political culture, it is unlikely that an interpretation of impor-
tance as not important to the common citizenry but important to those setting the national agenda
in Washington is likely to fly in the national political debate.
84. See Kramer, supra note 36, at 1504.
85. Id.
86. Baker, supra note 12, at 52-53.
87. Resnik, supra note 31.
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grounds that these exclusions are, in essence, statements that women
"are assumed not to be related to the national issues to which the
federal judiciary is to devote its interest."88
It is hard to dispute Resnik on this point. If the federal courts are
to be "reserved for issues where important national issues
predominate,"8 9 then it follows that opposing the federalization of
crimes of violence against women and abstaining from domestic re-
lations cases are in effect political statements that gender matters
are not at the heart of the national agenda.
The question, however, is whether it make sense to interpret fed-
eralization and federal jurisdiction in this manner. The protection of
individuals from violence, for example, is undoubtedly a matter of
the highest importance, but once federalization and federal jurisdic-
tion is treated as a political statement, the fact that murder is not a
federal crime begins to suggest that the national commitment to
ending violent death is only half-hearted. Or to again reinvoke the
Crime Bill, if the political culture is such that important issues are
to be federalized, then a national commitment against gang violence
requires that street crime by gangs should be treated as a federal
offense. The point, I hope is clear: The importance, rationale is only
an invitation to, and not a limitation on, federalization.
The final deficiency in the importance rationale is its potential
damaging effect on state courts. The critical significance of state
courts to the effective administration of justice in this society can
not be overstated. Quantitatively, "an estimated ninety-five to
ninety-nine percent of all litigation in the United States occurs in
state courts." 90 Qualitatively the state courts still remain the pri-
mary forums where individuals litigate the issues that affect them
most. Logically, it would seem that the protection of the resources
and the abilities of the state courts to effectively function should be
the top judicial priority; particularly given the near crisis conditions
currently surrounding many state courts,9 and the reality that
88. Resnik argues that matters of concern to women are excluded through such devices as the
domestic relations abstention doctrine and the federal judiciary's institutional opposition to the
federalizing of crimes involving violence against women. Id. at 1749.
89. Rehnquist, supra note 82, at 76.
90. Baker, supra note 12, at 11 (citing FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL-COURTS, LAWYERING
AND JUDGING 56 (1994) (reporting that state cases occupy 99% of the field at the trial level);
Vincent L. McKusick, Combining Resources, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 19, 1990, at 13 (stating that over
95% of all litigation in this country occurs in state courts).
91. See Baker, supra note 12, at 15 (citing COFFIN, supra note 90, at 62-63).
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demographics and political forces are likely to cause the condition of
state courts to further worsen in the future. In the words of Profes-
sor Thomas E. Baker, the "future of the state courts will be 'more
or less' the same as the present. .'more' cases and 'less'
resources."
92
A political culture that treats the federal courts as the premiere
guardians of important rights and thereby relegates the state courts
to essentially secondary status, can only exacerbate the state courts'
resource concerns. When the state courts are no longer viewed as
the primary judicial system for most individuals, it follows that pub-
lic commitment to appropriate levels of funding may also drop. Cer-
tainly a state politician who has seen his federal counterpart receive
all the accolades for pushing a particular measure may feel reluc-
tant to fund more resources for the state courts so that the state
courts can clear up the federal courts' unfinished business. It may
also be true that the quality of those serving on the bench is likely to
suffer as less pay, poorer working conditions, and diminished pres-
tige will make serving on the state bench less attractive.
The benefit of federalizing particular issues in short, may be that
it assures that a matter is perceived as having national significance.
The detriment, however, may be to assure that the vast majority of
cases which have to remain in state courts because of capacity issues
alone, will not receive adequate judicial treatment. The protection of
important rights, then, might be better pursued by advocating im-
provement of the state courts rather than seeking the gloss of feder-
alization. The point, therefore, is simple: the rhetoric of importance
should be removed from the political culture in deciding issues of
federalization and federal jurisdiction.93
92. Id. at 10.
93. Importantly, recent leading studies in this area do not refer to importance as a criteria in
determining whether or not to federalize. See Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 3, at 77-94
(arguing that there are some areas where federal jurisdiction is essential, and other areas where
the state courts could play a greater role); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judi-
cial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chroni-
cles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1795 (1992) (suggesting that the criteria for making a reduction in
federal dockets should be based on a general assessment of how well certain kinds of cases would
be served under federal jurisdiction); COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, PROPOSED LONG
RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 19-32
(Nov. 1994) (suggesting that federal jurisdiction should be determined by such factors as effect on
the federal government, involvement of multiple states, relation to federal interests, relation to
federal constitution or statutes).
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CONCLUSION
As long as the rhetoric is maintained that the most important
problems facing this society should be nationalized, and as long as
the economics of public choice is such that it is easier to promote
substantive policies at the federal rather than the state level, the
push for federalization is not likely to subside. While there may be a
brief downturn in the federalization trend given the announced com-
mitment of the new Republican Congress, there is little likelihood
that a defederalization momentum is likely to be sustained even if it
does occur as long as federalization remains equated with the im-
portance of the substantive issue involved.
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March 29, 1993
The Honorable William H. Rehnquist
Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20543
The Honorable Janet Reno
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Tenth and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senator
SR-221 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-0802
The Honorable Jack Brooks
United States Congress
2449 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-4309
Dear Mr. Chief Justice, General Reno, Senator Biden, and
Congressman Brooks:
Future historians of the federal courts will
likely look to the 1990's as a time when the
nation had to confront, and decide, core
questions about the federal courts and their
role in our polity.
Chief Justice William n. Pehnquist, Welcoming Remarks Before the
1993 National Workshop for Judges of the U.S. Courts of Appeals
(Feb. 8, 1993).
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I write to all three branches of government because the
problem I describe, I believe,--can be alleviated only by three-
branch cooperation. My recommendation is modest -- but first the
problem.
By all accounts, the federal judiciary is fast approach-
ing a crisis point. In the past 10 years, we have witnessed an
ever-rising tide of filings in the appellate, district, and
bankruptcy courts.
The numbers are startling. Between 1981 and 1991, the
total number of cases filed in the United States Courts of Appeals
increased by nearly 60 percent. See 1991 Annual Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Table 1, at 81. Over the same 10-year period, the total number of
criminal cases filed in the federal district courts increased by
nearly 50 percent. See id, Table 8, at 90. Drug-related cases,
which constitute a large portion of our appellate docket, more
than tripled. See id. Civil cases are often placed on the back
burner, in some jurisdictions, as the judges try to cope with the
flood of drug and gun cases. Nor is the picture brighter for
bankruptcy courts; between 1981 and 1991, total filings more than
doubled. See id. Table 13, at 104.
The dramatic growth in the federal caseload, especially
before the Courts of Appeals, has serious implications for the
federal judiciary. Obviously, clogged dockets have resulted in
increased delay and expense. Some of the negative consequences
are more subtle, yet just as real. As we are called upon to re-
solve more and more cases, our ability to focus attention on any
one case must necessarily diminish, and the quality of our work
will suffer. In addition, we have been forced to adopt, and will
continue to adopt, shortcuts to cope with the rising volume: we
hear fewer oral arguments, publish fewer opinions, and rely more
heavily on law clerks and staff attorneys. The heavy volume of
cases thus threatens the ability of the federal judiciary to give
each case the attention and care it deserves.
The principal cause of this growth in our dockets is no
secret. Traditionally, the federal courts heard a very narrow
range of cases. Over the past several years, however, Congress
has enacted a host of new federal criminal statutes and civil
claims. In many areas, most notably the war on drugs, Congress
740 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:719
The Honorable William H. Rehnquist March 29, 1993
The Honorable Janet Reno
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
The Honorable Jack Brooks
Page 3
has restated state law into federal law. As a result, cases that
at one time would have been handled by state courts are now in the
federal courts.
Will this increased federalization of the law abate?
Last year, Congress made carjacking and the willful failure to pay
child-support obligations federal crimes. See Anti Car Theft Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (1992); Child Support
Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403 (1992).
Congress also created a civil claim in federal court for victims
of international terrorism. See Federal Courts Administration Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506, 4521-24 (1992).
This year, Congress will probably consider the proposed Violence
Against Women Act and the Crime Bill.
I do not wish to denigrate either the merit or the
importance of any of this legislation. Nor do I suggest that
Congress should not consider these issues -- formulation of such
policies is the province of the political branches. My position,
rather, is that our country has reached a point where it can no
longer ignore the cost the creation of additional rights and rem-
edies imposes on the federal system. I realize that national
policy reasons may exist which deem it important to declare that
the federal courts should assume jurisdiction over cases tradi-
tionally handled by the states. Given the increasingly national
scope of many of the problems facing our society, our substantive
law cannot always be divided neatly into the inherently federal
and the inherently local. But clearly, the federal government
alone cannot solve every problem confronting our nation. The
fact that a particular area of the law could be handled in
federal court does not necessarily mean that it should be.
Up until now, the federal courts have handled less than
two percent of our country's litigation. The federal courts are
small and specialized bodies, dedicated to dealing with unique
federal problems. State courts, with fully qualified judges, are
prepared to handle nearly all of the total cases filed. Thus, the
goal should be to determine which of the cases that have national
implications should, and must, be heard by the federal courts,
taking into account both the importance of the federal interest
at stake and the impact on the federal court system.
Assuming this analysis to be acceptable, the question
then is, what should be done? The traditional response has been
1995] A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 741
The Honorable William H. Rehnquist March 29, 1993
The Honorable Janet Reno
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
The Honorable Jack Brooks
Page 4
for Congress to create more federal judgeships. Although the
federai court system could probably absorb additional judges, can
continued horizontal expansion solve the problem in the future?
See Wallace, Working Pa er -- Future of the Judicidr, 94 F.R.D.
225, 227-28 (1981). The federal courts are unique because they
state the federal law, and they must be small enough to do so. At
some point -- and I am not sure what that point is -- the confu-
sion and conflict between and among circuits could threaten to
overwhelm whatever efficiency gains might otherwise obtain from
creating additional judgeships. Litigants would not discern
federal principles, but would hear a tower of Babel.
Recently, two of my fellow judges offered their own
solutions for alleviating the pressures on the federal court
system. My colleague Stephen Reinhardt boldly suggests that the
size of the federal courts of appeals be doubled. See Reinhardt,
Too Few Judges. Too Many Cases, A.B.A. Journal, Jan. 1993, at 52,
53. His proposal is not based on numerical studies or projections
but rather on his own "practical knowledge and experience." Id.
I fear that his plan will do little to alleviate the
long-term problems facing our court system. It is the band-aid
approach which bothers me. Judge Reinhardt does not offer any
rational way of determining how many judges our system needs or
should have, either now or in the future. Gut feelings should
not guide so crucial a policy choice. Moreover, Judge Reinhardt
focuses on only half the equation: the number of federal judges.
He ignores the equally important problem of too much law. I
realize that he did not intend to address the increased volume,
but should not a plan analyze both aspects? Without some change
in the present trend toward federalizing more of what is now state
law, there is no reason to believe that his proposal to double the
number of appellate judgeships today will not lead to another dou-
bling several years down the road, followed by another doubling
after that.
Judge Jon 0. Newman of the Second Circuit takes a
different tack. He asserts that the real threat to the federal
court system is the unrestrained growth in the number of judges.
He argues that Congress should hold the number of authorized
Article III judgeships -- both district and appellate -- at 1,000,
a number he believes is the limit for an effective federal ju-
diciary. See Newman, 1.000 Judges -- The Limit for an Effective
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Federal Judiciary, Judicature, Dec.-Jan. 1993, at 187. In an
effort to control the caseload flowing through the federal system,
Judge Newman would eliminate diversity jurisdiction and would
de-federalize several areas of federal substantive law. Id. at
194. Although I agree with Judge Newman that there is some limit
to the number of Article III judges our court system can sustain,
I do not believe we can simply set an arbitrary cut-off, such as
1,000 judges. Judge Newman also rightfully points out that many
federal crimes could probably be prosecuted effectively in state
courts. He fails, however, to provide a mechanism for determining
which cases should be heard by federal courts. In my view, the
appropriate number of judges can be selected only after consider-
ing both the needs of the judiciary and the policy demands of
Congress and the public.
I suggest that our present ad hoc approach to the prob-
lems facing the federal courts is counterproductive. Too often,
the federalization of crime and the creation of new federal claims
are treated as somehow independent of the crisis facing the fed-
eral courts. The answer, also too often, is simply to add more
judges, although in an amount that always seems to lag behind the
number needed to process the ever-growing volume of cases. Thus,
we create new federal law now and only worry about the conse-
quences for our federal court system later. I believe that focus
must first be on two basic principle: what does our country want
and need from our federal court system, and how can it be ob-
tained?
The only way to achieve long-term solutions is to de-
velop a procedure to evaluate new federal law and its impact on
the federal court system. The first step is to develop the
mission of the federal courts. What types of issues should be
handled by the federal courts? Congress's increasing tendency
to federalize areas of the law that were once within the domain
of the state courts should force the answering of the question:
are federal courts the proper forum to right all of the ills
facing society today? It is not enough to recognize that a
problem -- whether it be drug trafficking or domestic violence --
is important, and at times even a national issue. That often
cannot be denied. Should we not also ask: can the state courts
handle these cases aduquately? In other words, we must somehow
develop a method to prioritize the types of cases that are to come
before the federal courts.
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Next, consideration should be given to the ability of
the federal court system to carry out that mission. What is our
institutional capacity to adjudicate the volume of cases before
us, now and in the future? We mu2t analyze our ability to evalu-
ate the legal and factual issues before us, the efficiency with
which we can process our caseload, and the resultant quality of
our decisions. Is there a maximum volume of work that should be
assigned to the federal judiciary? Is there some upper limit to
the number of judges our system can sustain before confusion and
conflict overwhelm the judicial enterprise? Assuming, as I think
we must, that there is some ceiling on our ability to handle an
increasingly complex and heavy caseload, how can it be determined?
I suggest that the mission of the federal courts must be
developed jointly by the three branches of our government. Mem-
bers of the political branches focus primarily on the political
costs and benefits of enacting a given piece of legislation. The
impact of that law on the efficient administration of the courts
is ordinarily considered as a peripheral issue, if it is con-
sidered at all. As judges, we are all too aware of the pressures
placed on us by the growing volume of federal law. Because of the
nature of our role in the constitutional scheme, however, we must
stand separate from the political process. Sorting out essential
federal rights and obligations from all of the important public
issues involves hard political choices. Thus, it is only by
analyzing the problem together that we can hope to achieve a
rational, long-term solution.
I therefore come to my proposal: the creation of a
national conference, with representatives from all three branches
of government, to study the problems facing the federal court
system. The conference would produce a long-range statement about
the mission of the federal courts.
The end result of this process would be to establish
practical guidelines to channel decisions regarding the creation
of new federal law and the reform of the federal court system.
For example, if Congress wishes to pass a naw law federalizing
some aspect of state law, it would first ask how this new law fits
within the mission of the federal courts, taking into account the
institutional constraints at work. Once the mission of the courts,.
has been developed, the number of judges needed to carry it out
can be determined. In this way, the size and structure of the
744 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:719
The Honorable William H. Rehnquist March 27, 1993
The Honorable Janet Reno
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
The Honorable Jack Brooks
Page 7
judiciary would be determined not by arbitrary limits or requests,
but by application of enunciated principles derived from the
adopted mission of the federal courts.
When confronted by this issue, the subcommittee of the
Federal Courts Study Committee, formed to analyze the role of the
federal courts and their relations to the states, concluded that
it "should not try to draft a detailed blueprint for the proper
scope of federal jurisdiction." 1 Federal Courts Study Committee,
Working Papers 103 (1990). The subcommittee concluded:
Any model identifying the "proper" role of the
federal courts thus has inescapable and far-
reaching substantive implications, and as a
result an unavoidable political dimension.
The Federal Court Study Committee is not a
representative body and its membership does
not reflect many of the relevant interests.
Defining the role of the federal courts simply
is not the kind of task that Congress can
delegate to an outside body of experts; it is
not a scientific inquiry.
Id. at 105. That is why I first proposed a three-branch commis-
sion to study the future of the judiciary, rather than a study
housed in one branch. See Working Paper, supra, at 235-36. The
creation of the committee from one branch prevented the type of
analysis I -- then and now -- propose. A three-branch conference
would be an adequate and effective vehicle for the purpose of
establishing a mission of the federal courts.
But if the conference does not result in a statute, and
is no more specific than a mission, how will it help? Establish-
ing common ground among the branches on the mission of the federal
judiciary will not solve problems. What it will do is sharpen the
issue for rational resolution. Too often the debate is over the
importance of the issue under consideration and whether all judges
are working hard enough. As outlined above, a mission statement
would allow debate over whether this is one of those unique areas
where federal rather than state courts should take responsibility.
Another necessary ingredient would be whether adding the required
judge power is consistent with the uniqueness of the federal ju-
diciary.
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A three-branch conference is worth trying and worth the
investment of our best efforts. It could provide a new watershed
to maintaining the effectiveness of the federal judiciary in
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APPENDIX B
Summary of new offenses in the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
DEATH PENALTY
Murder committed in a federal correctional institution by a federal
prisoner serving a term of life imprisonment.
(§S 60005)
Drive-by shooting in relation to a major drug offense.
(Q 60008)
Foreign murder of a United States national. (§ 60009)
Murder by an escaped federal prisoner serving a term of life impris-
onment. (§ 60012)
Murder of a State or local officer assisting a federal criminal inves-
tigation. (§ 60015)
Sexual abuse within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States or in a Federal prison resulting in death.
(§ 60010)
Sexual exploitation of children involving interstate or foreign com-
merce resulting in death. (§ 60011)
Murder or attempted murder involving the use of a firearm or other
dangerous weapon during an attack in a federal facility. (§ 60014)
Murder or attempted murder in retaliation against a witness, victim,
or an informant involving federal proceedings.
(§ 60017)
Taking by force and violence or intimidation a motor vehicle that
has moved in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to cause
death or serious bodily harm (i.e., carjacking).
(§ 60003)
NEW OFFENSES TO IMPLEMENT UNITED STATES
TREATY OBLIGATIONS INVOLVING CRIMES AT INTER-
NATIONAL AIRPORTS, AND MARITIME VESSELS AND
PLATFORMS
Seizing a ship by force or threat. (§ 60019)
Performing an act of violence on a ship if the act may endanger its
safe navigation. (§ 60019)
Destroying or damaging a ship or its cargo if the act
may endanger the ship's safe navigation, (Q 60019)
Placing a device or substance on a ship which is likely
to destroy it or endanger its safe navigation (§ 60019)
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Destroying maritime navigational facilities or interfering
with their operation if doing so may endanger the safe
navigation of a ship. (§ 60019)
Knowingly communicating false information and thereby
endangering the safe navigation of a ship. (§ 60019)
Injuring or killing any person in connection with
a crime of violence against maritime navigation.
(§ 60019)
Threatening to commit an act of violence on a ship or to
destroy a ship or navigational facilities, if the threatened
act may endanger the safe navigation of a ship. (§ 60019)
Seizing a fixed maritime platform by force or threat.
(§ 60019)
Performing an act of violence on a fixed maritime platform if the
act may endanger its safety. (§ 60019)
Destroying or damaging a fixed maritime platform if the damage
may endanger its safety. (§ 60019)
Placing a device or substance on a fixed maritime platform which is
likely to destroy it or endanger its safety.
(§ 60019)
Killing or injuring any person in connection with a crime of violence
against a fixed maritime platform. (§ 60019)
Threatening to perform an act of violence on or destroy or damage a
fixed maritime platform if the threatened act may endanger the
safety of the fixed maritime platform.
(§ 60019)
Performing an act of violence that causes serious bodily injury or
death of a person at an international airport.
(§ 60021)
Destroying or damaging the facilities of an international airport if
the act may endanger safety at that airport.
(§ 60021)
Using a weapon of mass destruction against a national of the United
States outside the United States. (§ 60023)
Using a weapon of mass destruction against any person within the
United States. (§ 60023)
Using a weapon of mass destruction against property of the United
States. (§ 60023)
TERRORISM
Counterfeiting United States currency outside the United States.
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(§ 120003)
Providing material support to terrorists. (§ 120005)
Terrorist offenses by or against a national of the United States on a
foreign vessel having a scheduled arrival or departure from the
United States. (§ 120002)
ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN AND FIREARMS
Manufacture, transfer, or possession of a semiautomatic assault
weapon. (§ 110102)
Use or possession of a semiautomatic assault weapon during a crime
of violence or drug trafficking offense. (§ 110102)
Transfer or possession of a large capacity ammunition feeding de-
vice. (§ 110103)
Smuggling firearms into the United States in aid of drug trafficking.
(§ 110503)
Theft of a firearm moving as, or which has moved in, interstate or
foreign commerce. (§ 110504)
Theft of explosives moving as, or which have moved in, interstate or
foreign commerce. (§ 110504)
Possession by prohibited persons of an explosive which has moved in
interstate or foreign commerce. (§ 110508)
Possession or sale of stolen firearms moving as, or which have moved
in, interstate or foreign commerce. (§ 110511)
Possession or sale of stolen ammunition moving as, or which has
moved in, interstate or foreign commerce. (§ 110511)
Receipt of firearms within a State by a non-resident of that State.
(§ 110514)
Theft of firearms from a licensee. (§ 110515)
Theft of explosives from a licensee. (§ 110515)
Disposing of explosives to prohibited persons. (§ 110516)
Interstate travel to acquire a firearm with intent to engage illegally
in the business of dealing in firearms. (§ 110517)
Knowingly making a false statement by an applicant for a firearms
license that the applicant's business is not prohibited under State or
local law. (§ 110302)
Knowingly making a false statement by a firearms licensee as to the
theft or loss of any firearm. (§ 110302)
YOUTH HANDGUN SAFETY
Possession of a handgun or handgun ammunition by a juvenile.
(§ 110201)





Commission of a crime of violence or drug felony by a member of a
criminal street gang, with knowledge that the gang's members en-
gaged in a continuing series of such crimes or with intent to pro-
mote the gang's activities or to maintain or increase the partici-
pant's position in such a gang, and if the defendant has a prior
conviction for one of several specified offenses. (§ 150001)
DRUG TRAFFICKING
Using a minor to distribute drugs at or near a school or at other
protected location. (§ 140006)
Using a minor to assist in avoiding detention or apprehension for
drug dealing. (§ 140006)
Placing a written advertisement in a publication for the purpose of
seeking illegally to receive or distribute a schedule I controlled sub-
stance. (§ 90106)
Distributing or manufacturing a controlled substance in or near
public housing. (§ 320107)
Distributing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled sub-
stance in or within 1,000 feet of a truck stop or safety rest area.
(§ 180201)
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Traveling interstate or entering or leaving Indian country with in-
tent to injure or intimidate one's spouse or intimate partner and
thereafter committing a crime of violence that causes bodily injury
to such spouse or intimate partner. (§ 40221)
Coercing or causing by fraud one's spouse or intimate partner to
travel interstate or enter or leave Indian country and thereafter
committing a crime of violence against that person which causes
bodily injury. (§ 40221)
Traveling interstate or entering or leaving Indian country with in-
tent to engage in conduct that violates a protection order protecting
the victim against credible threats of violence, harassment, or bodily
injury, and thereafter engaging in the prohibited conduct (irrespec-
tive of whether it occurs in the jurisdiction in which the order was
issued). (§ 40221)
Coercing or causing by fraud a spouse or intimate partner to travel
interstate or enter or leave Indian Country if injury in violation of a
valid protection order results. (§ 40221)
1995]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
DOMESTIC ABUSERS AND FIREARMS
Possession of a firearm by a person subject to an order restraining
the person from harassing, stalking or threatening an intimate part-
ner or such partner's child, or engaging in conduct that would place
the intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the part-
ner or his or her child. (§ 110401)
Transfer of a firearm to a person subject to an order restraining the
person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner
or such partner's child, or engaging in conduct that would place the
intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or
his or her child. (§ 110401)
CHILD PROTECTION
Assault within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States resulting in substantial bodily injury to a child
less than 16 years of age. (§ 170201)
Kidnapping of a child by a biological parent whose parental rights
have been terminated by court order. (§ 320924)
Sexual abuse within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United states through certain acts of touching the genitalia of
a young victim. (§ 40502)
CHILD SEX TOURISM
Traveling in interstate commerce, or in foreign commerce by a
United States citizen or permanent resident, with intent to commit a
sexual act with a minor that would be an offense if committed
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, regardless of
whether the act would be an offense under the law of the state or
country where it occurs. (§ 160001)
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Using a minor outside the United states to produce child pornogra-
phy (i.e., visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct) with intent
that it be imported into this country. (§ 160001)
Possessing or distributing child pornography outside the United
States with intent that it be imported into this country. (§ 160001)
TELEMARKETING FRAUD
Engaging in telemarketing fraud (i.e., the conduct by fraud of a
plan, program, promotion, or campaign using interstate telephone
calls to induce the purchase of goods or services or participation in a
contest or sweepstakes). (§ 250002)
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EXPANDED JURISDICTION FOR FRAUD OFFENSES
Engaging in a scheme to defraud, involving the depositing of any
matter to be delivered by a private or commercial interstate carrier.
(§ 250006)
CREDIT CARD FRAUD
Fraudulently using credit cards issued to another person to receive
more than $1,000 worth of goods in any one-year period.
(§ 250007)
Without authorization of the credit card issuer and with intent to
defraud, soliciting a person for the purpose of offering a credit card
or selling information or any application to obtain a credit card.
(§ 250007)
Without authorization of the credit card system member or its agent
(i.e., or a financial institution or entity such as a credit card issuer),
arranging, with intent to defraud, for another person to present to
the member or its agent for payment any record of transactions
made by a credit card. (§ 250007)
COMPUTER CRIME
Knowingly transmitting a computer program, information, code, or
command to a computer used in interstate commerce with intent
that the transmission will damage the computer, computer system,
data or program or deny the use of the computer or program, if the
transmission was without authority and causes more than $1,000 in
damage or loss or modifies or impairs medical care. (§ 290001)
Knowingly transmitting a computer program, information, code, or
command to a computer used in interstate commerce with reckless
disregard of the risk that the transmission will damage the com-
puter, computer system, data or program or deny the use of the
computer or program, if the transmission was without authority and
causes more than $1, 000 in damage or loss or modifies or impairs
medical care. (§ 290001)
MOTOR VEHICLE OFFENSES
Knowing disclosure by a State department of motor vehicles or an
employee or contractor thereof, except as specifically permitted, of
personal information about a person obtained by the department in
connection with a motor vehicle record. (§ 300002)
Knowingly obtaining or disclosing for any unauthorized use personal
information from a motor vehicle record. (§ 300002)
Making false representations to obtain any personal information
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from an individual's motor vehicle record. (§ 300002)
Knowingly removing, obliterating, tampering with, or altering an
identification number for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part.
(§ 220003)
Removing, obliterating, tampering with, or altering a theft preven-
tion decal or replica from a motor vehicle with intent to further the
theft of a motor vehicle. (§ 220003)
Unauthorized affixing of a theft prevention decal or replica to a mo-
tor vehicle. (§ 220003)
INSURANCE FRAUD
Knowingly making a false statement or overvaluing any land or se-
curity by an insurance company in connection with any financial
report or document presented to an insurance regulatory official or
agency, with intent to influence the actions of the official or agency.
(§ 320603)
Theft of property of an insurance company by an employee thereof.
(§ 320603)
Knowingly making false statement by an insurance company with
intent to deceive any person as to the financial condition or solvency
of the company. (§ 320603)
Corruptly obstructing any proceeding involving an insurance com-
pany pending before any insurance regulatory official or agency.
(§ 320603)
Engaging in the business of insurance by a person convicted of a
felony involving dishonesty or breach of trust. (Q 320603)
Willfully permitting participation in the business of insurance of a
person convicted of a felony involving dishonesty or breach of trust.
(§ 320603)
Obstructing by violence or retaliating against a person for partici-
pating in any proceeding involving an insurance company pending
before any insurance regulatory official or agency. (§ 320604)
Notifying any person of the existence or contents of a subpoena for
records of an insurance company, with intent to obstruct a judicial
proceeding, if done by an employee of the company. (§ 320604)
Participation in the affairs of a financial institution by a person con-
victed of a criminal offense involving dishonesty or a breach of trust,
or who has agreed to enter into a pretrial diversion program in con-
nection with a prosecution for such offense. (§§ 320605-6)
MONEY LAUNDERING
Laundering of monetary instruments involving the proceeds of traf-
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ficking in counterfeit goods and services. (§ 320104)
LOTTERIES
Transmission-Interstate of information for the purpose of procuring
a lottery ticket. (§ 320905)
MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES
Knowingly receiving the proceeds of extortion in violation of federal
law. (§ 320601)
Knowingly receiving the proceeds of kidnapping in violation of State
law if the proceeds have moved in interstate or foreign commerce.
(§ 320601)
Knowingly receiving the proceeds of a Postal robbery. (§ 320602)
Misuse of the initials "DEA" in any publication, play, broadcast, or
production in a manner reasonably calculated to convey that it is
approved or authorized by DEA. (§ 320911)
Mailing of prohibited injurious animals and plants. (§ 320108)
Knowingly selling a Congressional Medal of Honor. (§ 320109)
Theft of art work from a museum. (§ 320902)
WIRETAPS
Intentionally disclosing the contents of a lawful wiretap after having
received the information in connection with a criminal investigation,
with intent to obstruct or interfere with such an investigation.
(§ 320901)
ATTEMPT OFFENSES
Attempted theft by force within the special maritime or territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. (§ 320903)
Attempted robbery of personal property belonging to the United
States. (§ 320903)
Attempted robbery of mail of money or other property of the United
States. (§ 320903)
Attempted kidnapping of a person willfully transported in interstate
commerce, or within the special maritime, aircraft or territorial ju-
risdiction of the United States. (§ 320903)
Attempted smuggling of goods into the United States. (§ 320903)
Attempted damage to federal government property. (§ 320903)
Attempted willful or malicious injury or destruction of communica-
tions lines, stations or systems operated or controlled by the United
States, or used for military or civil defense functions of the United
States. (§ 320903)
Attempted damaging of an energy facility (i.e., a facility that is in-
1995]
754 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:719
volved in the production, storage, or distribution of energy or in re-
lated research). (§ 320903)
EXPANDED JURISDICTION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OFFENSE
Conspiracy to violate the civil rights of non-resident aliens in any
State, Territory or District. (§ 320201)
Deprivation under color of law of the civil rights of nonresident
aliens in any State, Territory or District. (§ 320201)
